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Abstract 
This article provides a critical overview of labour and employment policy under the Hollande 
presidency, evaluating the extent of continuity and change between 2012 and 2017. Although the 
term of office may be divided into three broad phases, with a shift towards more liberalising, 
business-friendly policies over time, it is argued that the period as a whole shows a high degree of 
continuity, with liberalising measures evident from 2012. The policy output may be characterised as 
a project of ‘bounded flexibility’ in which marketisation is contained within certain limits as defined 
by trade unions’ ability to set the agenda of social partner negotiations. However, towards the end 
of the presidency the push towards labour law reform, whilst falling short of a wholesale revision of 
France’s protective legislative architecture, ushered in key changes which the Macron presidency 
intends to take forward and radicalise, leading to a potential ‘tipping point’ of labour market 
deregulation. The Hollande presidency therefore holds important lessons for our understanding of 
social democracy at times of economic crisis and austerity. 
 
Résumé 
Cet article présente une évaluation critique de la politique de l’emploi poursuivie sous la présidence 
de François Hollande, en identifiant les éléments de continuité et de rupture. La période entre 2012 
et 2017 se divise en trois phases, qui marquent l’évolution vers une approche plus libérale et 
dérégulatrice, mais en termes de méthode et de contenu certains éléments de continuité subsistent, 
notamment l’adoption de lois ‘cadres’ qui ont pour effet de diluer l’impact dérégulateur des 
innovations. En ce sens la présidence se caractérise par la volonté de porter un projet de ‘flexibilité 
circonscrite’. L’adoption de la loi travail (ou la loi El Khomri) marque un changement de méthode et 
porte un projet potentiel, mais inachevé, de refonte plus radicale, ouvrant ainsi la voie à la version 
‘macroniste’ de dérégulation où les limites de la flexibilité, définies par la négociation collective 
décentralisée, seront assouplies jusqu’à un’ point de bascule’ éventuel. La période 2012-2017 met 
ainsi en relief les difficultés de la social-démocratie européenne en quête d’une conciliation entre 
compétitivité économique et protection sociale en période de crise. 
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Introduction 
The gap between public concern about unemployment and politicians’ attention to it, in an 
election campaign dominated by security fears, was the subject of much press comment in 
2017 (see for example Ruello 2017). Yet the 2017 presidential campaign was driven by 
responses to the incumbent administration’s failure to reduce unemployment, as candidate 
François Hollande had promised to do in 2012. Emmanuel Macron’s claim to office rested on 
the twin argument of the need for a clean break with the policies of the past, and for far-
reaching structural reform, to the extent that Le Monde journalists accused him of 
exaggerating the scale of the problem, especially his assertion in the first-round television 
debate that France was the only country in the EU which had not been able to tackle 
unemployment (Motet and Damgé 2017). In an interview published on 9 April, Mr Macron 
emphasised the need to move quickly on labour law reform, arguing that if enacted it would 
bring the unemployment rate down to 7% by the end of the presidential term (Macron 
2017). 
As is by now well established, the French unemployment trajectory reflects specific 
weaknesses (see Table 1). Although the unemployment rate stands just under the EU 
average, those countries with a worse record are largely the southern member states at the 
heart of the eurozone crisis. Since 2013, eurozone countries have seen a reduction in 
unemployment,whilst France has struggled to contain the rising trend since 2009. Eurostat’s 
figures at 2 May 2017 showed a rate of 9.5% for the eurozone (the lowest since 2009), 
compared to 10.1% in France (Eurostat 2017). Meanwhile youth unemployment remains 
stubborn at 23.6% in March 2017, markedly higher than the eurozone (19.4%) and EU 
(17.3%) averages (Eurostat 2017). Long-term unemployment is also high by European 
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standards, accounting for 42.7% of total unemployment in 2014, with those registered as 
unemployed having been so for 14.2 months on average (Insee 2016, 45). 
Table 1 here 
The broad conclusion to be drawn from the long-term trend in unemployment is that both 
the Sarkozy and Hollande presidencies put in place policy mixes (see Barbier 2008; Milner 
2012a, 2014) which had the effect of temporarily slowing down the inexorable rise in 
unemployment but had little impact on its progression in the longer term, and François 
Hollande’s specific pledge to reverse the tide of unemployment was not met. Ultimately, 
over and above personal mis-steps, this is what cost the incumbent his re-election and his 
legacy, and what caused the shock failure and current crisis of the ruling Socialist Party. 
There is no consensus among experts or among politicians about the best way to tackle 
unemployment (see Garner et al 2016). The OECD currently groups aspects of its 
recommended approach under the heading ‘activation’, defined as a concern ‘to bring more 
people into the labour force and into jobs’ and consisting of four main types of measure: 
increasing employability through skills investment; expanding job opportunities including for 
those currently outside the labour market; creating effective labour market institutions; and 
ensuring that the tax and benefits system creates appropriate incentives to work (OECD 
2015). Based on this approach, the OECD analysis sees France as needing to introduce 
labour market reform, such as measures to simplify redundancy procedures, in order to 
reduce segmentation (OECD 2016). In the short term the negative impact of such measures 
could be offset by increased passive and active labour market expenditure, it argues. Most 
experts agree with this broad analysis based on the need to expand labour market 
participation and invest in skills training aimed at adaptability, in light of France’s relatively 
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low employment rate (69.5% in 2015). Moreover, job creation has taken place largely at the 
lower end of the skills distribution. 
The European Union has for several years advocated more drastic reform measures and 
indeed included them in its budgetary surveillance programme, with a concern about public 
debt rather than with unemployment. Thus in its February 2017 recommendations it urged 
France, which is currently in the macroeconomic imbalances procedure (MIP), among other 
things to review its minimum wage and its unemployment benefit. For several years it has 
also pushed France to reform its complex system of employment contracts and to establish 
a single, more flexible contract (see Lux 2016). 
This article provides a critical overview of the Hollande presidency’s policy output on 
employment and the labour market, in light of policy recommendations by the EU and OECD 
and of Mr Macron’s 2017 campaign. In analysing policy outputs, two key structural 
institutional constraints must be taken into account. The first is party management in the 
context of a party which programmatically sticks to the left even whilst the party in 
government in the Fifth Republic has adapted to changing conditions of globalised 
capitalism and the strictures of European Union and eurozone membership (Bell and Criddle 
2014; see article by Clift and McDaniel in this issue). This disjuncture was exaggerated in the 
context of the polarising presidential election format and exacerbated in 2012 by the 
extraordinary circumstances of a need to contrast programmatically and in tone and style 
from the now unpopular Nicolas Sarkozy. As this article demonstrates, the discourse of a 
radically different left-wing approach to labour market policy created a political constraint 
which left the Hollande administration unable to present a coherent programme over its 
term of office, isolated the flagship measures of the early period from wider policy, and 
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placed it at the mercy of repeated media boobytraps when each quarter’s unemployment 
figures were announced. 
The second is the effect of the ‘fast presidency’ over five years which means that 
programmes must make a positive impact in the first six months or so to establish a strong 
base (Cole 2012), at the risk of destabilising government early on and creating lame duck 
presidencies. The regular programme of second order elections, which have the potential to 
destabilise administrations in mid-term or even early on, increase the sense of urgency. At 
the same time, powerful mechanisms for inertia exist, as President Sarkozy also discovered 
(see Milner 2012a). In the case of the left, the need to coopt trade unions and bring 
sceptical employers on board requires strong investment in robust mechanisms of social 
dialogue which are strongly managed by the state. 
As this overview will show, whilst significant overlapping aspects of policy may be observed, 
President Macron’s direct and top-down approach to reform contrasts with the record of 
the Hollande presidency, marked by a more discontinuous policy development and its 
presentation to the public. Three main phases of policy outputs are identified here, 
although as we will see the junctures are often blurred, with policy initiatives presented as 
new approaches borrowing from and building on initiatives undertaken in previous phases, 
including during the previous presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy. 
In order first to win the presidential race and then to create a climate of political and 
economic confidence for his reform plans, Mr Macron needed to distance himself from his 
precedessor and to emphasise the extent of policy change. However, as this article will 
demonstrate, the reform plan announced in June 2017 (which was adopted in the form of 
an enabling law at a special parliamentary session on 2 August, to come into force by the 
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end of September, allowing the president to enact measures by decree, according to a 
staged timetable scheduled to end by March 2019) may in several respects be seen as the 
continuation of policies undertaken under the Hollande presidency, albeit in more radical 
form, and arguably could not have been envisaged without the preparatory work already 
carried out in 2015-2016. The decision to deploy short-cutting methods such as the use of 
the ‘guillotine’ Article 49.3 (see Elgie and Grossman 2016, 188) for the adoption of the 2016 
labour law reform and the enactment of further reform by presidential decree in 2017 
demonstrates the divisive nature of this policy agenda, although there is an overwhelming 
consensus on the need for reform. Even after the presidential election and the legislative 
elections which gave President Macron his parliamentary majority, opinion polls showed a 
significant minority opposed to the reforms and a majority ‘worried’ about them (see for 
example FranceInfo 2017; Observatoire Social des Entreprises 2017; Verner 2017). 
In the following sections, the article identifies key policy outputs from three phases of the 
Hollande presidency, discussing elements of continuity and change, before categorising the 
outputs and assessing the overall record in the concluding section. 
 
Delivering the 2012 campaign promises: governing on the left? 
Hollande’s 2012 manifesto made a series of specific pledges about measures to tackle youth 
unemployment, notably the introduction of ‘generation’ contracts and the creation of 
150,000 new jobs through ‘future’ contracts (Pledge 34 of the 60 Commitments), as well as 
new measures to ‘make secure’ employment rights, increase investment in training targeted 
at the less qualified and long-term unemployed, invest in job placement services at Pôle 
Emploi, create jobs in education (Pledge 35). Alongside these promises was a set of 
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measures aimed at simplifying procedures for small businesses, the establishment of a 
public investment bank, and measures to disencentivise ‘race-to-the bottom’ cross-border 
company relocations and ‘licenciements boursiers’. Accompanying the package of measures 
was a pledge about the method of governance, with a commitment to social dialogue as the 
means of drafting proposals. 
The two flagship measures on youth unemployment have been widely discussed (see Milner 
2014). Broadly these initiatives correspond to a subsidised employment approach which has 
been criticised as having little effect on unemployment overall, because it leads to 
displacement of jobs. However, the French approach which although most strongly 
associated with the left has also been practised under centre-right governments has two key 
features which mitigate negative effects largely associated with displacement: first, in 
emphasising skills development the initiatives aimed to reduce the potential for simple job 
displacement; second, unlike direct state investment in public sector jobs the measures 
were intended to boost business confidence by reducing the tax burden through the system 
of credits linked to number of posts created. Unfortunately for the administration, the latter 
dynamic did not occur in the context of depressed eurozone economic activity and the 
promised introduction of high-earner taxes, and the government was forced to resort to a 
higher than anticipated number of directly subsidised public and parapublic sector job 
creation. 
Just over 40,000 ‘generation’ contracts had been signed between by the end of 2015, fewer 
than a quarter of the total promised. The Cour des Comptes evaluating the initiative in 2016 
recognised its innovative nature (“un instrument spécifique et original au sein de la politique 
de l’emploi, dont il n’existe pas d’équivalent ailleurs en Europe”: p.61) but called it baldly a 
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‘failure’, which it attributed to a lack of adequate information and support for companies in 
the context of a complex policy design (Cour des Comptes 2016). In addition the evaluation 
highlighted the hasty preparation of the law, which had taken place in national level social 
partner negotiations which were hurriedly conducted under pressure from the government. 
The third plank of this approach was, as pledged in 2012, to bring together the existing 
subsidised contracts and strengthen their ‘active’ dimension by investment in skills training. 
In fact, investment in activation remained stable at 2.4% of GDP in 2013, putting France in 
seventh position in the EU (Garner et al 2016, 6), so the promised re-activation did not take 
place, as concern with the two flagship initiatives on ‘generation’ and ‘future’ contracts 
apparently took priority. 
Policy outputs depended to a large extent on decentralisation of collective bargaining, 
continuing a policy method developed since the 1980s by governments of the right and the 
left. This distinctively French mode of governance has been termed managed bargaining 
(Groux 2005) or bargained policy (Mias et al 2016). Thus, the generation contracts were 
initiated at company level by a process of collective bargaining. The accompanying effects of 
the measures are therefore difficult to evaluate in quantitative terms but they appear to 
have contributed to a wider process of decentralised, bargained change. However, although 
this may have led to improvements in local bargaining in some companies (see e.g. Picut 
2015), this was not always the case, and in order to access the financial incentives it has 
been claimed that some companies conducted hasty and ill-prepared bargaining processes 
(Cour des Comptes 2016, 65-66). This example highlights the ambivalent impact of 
decentralised bargaining which is of central relevance to current debates about how to 
conduct labour market reform, as we shall see later. 
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Meanwhile at national level social dialogue was promoted from the early days of the 
Hollande presidency, with a series of high-level conferences in the summer of 2012 covering 
pensions and social protection, training, employment. The pledge to make employment 
more secure was envisaged within the context of bargained flexibility whereby employers 
could obtain greater contractual flexibility through local processes of collective bargaining 
with trade unions, and in exchange for portable individual rights for employees. However 
such mutual concessions proved difficult to obtain, particularly in the tight timescale 
imposed by the government. The national agreement of 11 January 2013 and its subsequent 
transposition into law on 14 June highlight both the strengths and weaknesses of this 
approach. 
In substantive terms, the law introduced a certain number of changes to portability of 
rights. Whilst it increased health insurance coverage for a much lower number of employees 
on fixed-term contracts than had been anticipated, it extended benefits for almost a million 
people who otherwise would have exhausted entitlement, mainly older and less qualified 
unemployed workers. The creation of a personal training account for all employees from the 
age of 16, funded by the company training levy amounting to 0.2% of the wage bill, offered 
rights to up to 100 hours of training and accompanying advice particularly to those coming 
to the end of employment contracts, but was also slow to get off the ground, due in part to 
the need for administrative processing arrangements to be set up by local training and job 
search agencies. It was taken up again later in successive attempts to increase the visibility 
and take-up of training rights.  
The impact of the 2013 law on employer-oriented flexibility was potentially more significant. 
It allowed sectoral-level bargaining on marginal part-time working (under the legal limit of 
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24 hours per week), which was taken up in around 50 branches of the economy, particularly 
health and other care sectors. Most controversially, it authorised companies to impose, 
subject to collective agreement, internal redeployment of employees, including to 
geographically remote sites. The labour ministry’s own evaluation in 2015 could however 
not find any cases where mobility had been imposed on staff, perhaps because companies 
already had the capacity to move their workforce internally without having to formalise the 
practice through collective bargaining (Ministère du Travail 2015). A more significant change 
came with the extension of support for short-time working, already developed to some 
extent under the Sarkozy presidency, which was taken up by increasing numbers of 
companies, particularly smaller enterprises, and those in the construction and services 
sectors (see Milner 2012a). In addition, the law brought in ‘competitiveness pacts’ which 
President Sarkozy had sought unsuccessfully to introduce, allowing companies to reduce 
wages or other benefits or working time as a way of safeguarding jobs; around 20 
companies in industry, especially automotive and aerospace, used this provision (Ministère 
du Travail 2015). Finally, the law made regulation of collective redundancies more flexible 
by removing the need for state authorisation procedures in cases where plans had been 
approved by collective bargaining. In drafting the law the government had not taken on 
board the employer position, successfully incorporated into the January agreement, which 
was to remove legal authorisation procedures entirely. Instead, it opted for a bargained 
regulation procedure which had the effect of relaxing the existing legal restrictions allowing 
collective redundancies only in cases of demonstrable economic difficulty. 
The 2013 law also sought to strengthen the institutional basis of bargained flexibility, first by 
requiring companies with a workforce of at least 300 to appoint an employee 
representative, and second by encouraging businesses to set up employee databases aimed 
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at planning for workforce support such as training based on real and projected needs. 
Reviewing the law in 2016, the thinktank Terra Nova argued that its main contribution had 
been to promote local dialogue, strengthening a shift away from information and 
consultation towards substantive bargaining around company restructuring. However it 
pointed out that institutional change had not been sufficiently robust to effect cultural 
change in organisations (Terra Nova 2016), despite later incremental additions as outlined 
below. 
Overall, the January 2013 law sent signals about the government’s desire for new forms of 
crisis-induced concession bargaining, and represented a more thorough attempt to balance 
rights for workers and flexibility for employers at a time of economic downturn than the 
previous ‘secure employment’ initiatives undertaken under the previous administration (see 
Milner 2012b). Although in practice it introduced few substantive changes in the short term, 
not least because the combination of flexibility and cost savings with formalised processes 
of collective bargaining appealed in practice to a minority of companies, it established a 
number of initiatives which were developed in later phases. 
Thus, already from the end of 2012, a change of approach had been visible with emphasis 
on company tax credits and revision of redundancy rules. Faced with the continued rise of 
unemployment and growing resentment on the right over taxation, and the prospect of 
municipal and European Parliament elections in the coming year, President Hollande 
changed tack in January 2014 with a clean sweep of government headed by Manuel Valls. 
He initially attempted to soften the political rationale for the policy mix, notably in a press 
conference on 16 May 2013 (Albertini 2013), then emphasised a break with previous policy, 
as in his new year address which was accompanied by an extraordinary mea culpa, 
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generating accusations within his own party that the 2012 promises had been broken (see 
e.g. The Economist 2014). 
 
The responsibility pact with business: more of the same, or different? 
The Valls government from March 2014 set great store by the ‘responsibility pact’ with 
businesses, already announced by the President in his new year’s address earlier that year. 
Under this pact, businesses would create new jobs in return for tax credits and reductions, 
aimed particularly at small companies, in order to kick-start the economy for a limited 
period. The initiative built on a system of tax credits known as CICE (Crédit d’impôt pour la 
compétitivité et l’emploi) already in place, following the recommendations of the 
investment commissioner Louis Gallois in November 2012. The CICE cost around 20 billion 
euros in 2013, funded by an VAT increase, but its employment impact was disappointing: 
between 50,000 and 100,000 jobs created (Bayardin 2014; Pisani-Ferry 2016). 
The responsibility pact extending the CICE continued to form the basis of government policy 
for the remainder of the presidency, with President Hollande in his new year address in 
2016 announcing that the initiative would be continued and deepened as France remained 
in an economic as well as national security ‘state of emergency’. However, how far this 
initiative marked a break with earlier policy is debatable and it can be seen as an extension 
of a long-standing policy under both mainstream right and left. In the recent period, the 
usefulness of this policy instrument has reached its limits due to the strain it places on the 
state budget (Garner et al 2016: 8) at a time of deepening debt: France’s public 
indebtedness reached 99.5% of GDP at the end of 2016. The tax credits system cost an 
estimated 48 billion euros between 2015 and 2017. The Haut Conseil des Finances Publiques 
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warned in 2014 that the government’s anticipated virtuous cycle of jobs investment through 
tax credits could run aground if public debt depressed business confidence, restricting the 
flow of new employment-based receipts. Alternatively, cuts in public expenditure could 
fund a ‘project of capital-friendly austerity’ (Lux 2015, 93) but these proved difficult to attain 
given the 2012 promises to reverse the previous administration’s freeze on public sector 
employment. The main savings were to be gained through reorganisation of territorial 
administration, and to a lesser extent through attempts to control social expenditure. 
As for the earlier period, the intended vehicle for oversight and distribution of the tax 
credits in relation to their job creation outcome was to be collective bargaining, this time at 
branch level. However bargaining remained a minority activity. Medef identified 24 
agreements: mostly the branches in sectors with the strongest bargaining culture and 
containing the biggest companies took the lead, leaving many sectors exposed and overall 
an uneven coverage. Trade unions particularly the CGT and FO highlighted displacement 
effects, and accused some companies of taking the money to fund jobs which would have 
been created anyway to fill vacancies left by retirement (see Birchem 2016). 
The middle period of the Hollande presidency saw a series of initiatives to tighten labour 
market policy whilst strengthening local bargaining institutions, in line with the earlier 2013 
law. The arrival of Emmanuel Macron at the finance ministry marked a more decisive shift 
towards a reform agenda, most notably in the controversial law bearing his name which 
revived the proposals of the 2008 Attali commission on economic competitiveness. The 
thrust of the law was to tackle regulatory practices seen as restrictive. Protest from the 
regulated professions and from trade unions opposed to moves to allow Sunday trading 
meant that the law’s passage through parliament became stormy and protracted, 
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culminating in the use of Article 49.3 to force it through in July 2015. Although economists 
broadly supported the initiative and highlighted the symbolic value of the deregulatory 
initiative, many argued that its combination of specific small-scale changes limited its impact 
(Calignon 2014). The main effect of the law was to deregulate some transport sectors 
especially coaches, leading to modest job creation; meanwhile those trade unions opposed 
to Sunday trading could slow down or obstruct local bargaining processes (Bertrand and 
Chauvot 2016). 
The other major initiative of this period was the Rebsamen law, bearing the name of the 
new labour minister, which brought together measures aimed at building on the 2013 law 
and innovations from the national-level social dialogue process, particularly the June 2013 
agreement on ‘quality of working life’. The Rebsamen law too proved difficult to enact, due 
to successful feminist and trade union mobilisation against the proposed company database 
to support workforce planning and collective bargaining, which was initially seen as diluting 
and downgrading employer duties to collect and report gendered data. 
Adopted in July 2015 and promulgated in August 2016, the Rebsamen law made two 
significant sets of changes. First, it clarified employer duties to engage in collective 
bargaining annually on wages and working time, and on ‘quality of working life’ (working 
conditions and qualitative employee rights), and every three years on workforce planning. 
Second, it introduced new rules on employee representation in the workplace: it required 
gender parity of candidate lists at workplace elections; it allowed companies to merge 
representative structures in companies with between 50 and 300 employees (previously 
200) and in larger companies by way of a collective agreement signed by unions 
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representing at least 50% of workers; and it established procedures for electing regional 
joint representative committees for workers in companies with ten employees or fewer. 
The Rebsamen law also included a move to tighten conditionality of unemployment benefits 
and social assistance (the more coercive dimension of activation). The controversial 
activation element of the social minimum RSA (Revenu Social d’Activité) (see Vlandas 2013; 
Windebank 2012) was now merged with the tax credit prime pour l’emploi, introduced 
under the Jospin government in 2001, to form the prime d’activité which came into force in 
2016. The effect of this change remains largely unknown to date; its labour market 
expansion effect depends on complex household choices in relation to women returners’ 
labour market position, and may therefore be limited, particularly since the investment in 
childcare which accompanied the earlier reform under Sarkozy was not replicated under the 
socialists. The employers’ association Medef welcomed the initiative but argued that further 
measures were needed to reduce the cost of labour, in particular reform of labour law, and 
reform of the minimum wage to allow lower ‘transition’ rates for trainees coming into the 
labour market from unemployment, particularly younger workers. 
This review of the major initiatives in the second period analysed here (2014-2015) shows 
that it is too simplistic to divide the Hollande presidency into three neat phases each with 
distinct time periods and cut-off dates. Rather it identifies a set of plot threads developing, 
with the more liberalising threads gaining prominence towards the end of the presidency, 
and the more overtly social-democratic threads fading out rather early. This is not entirely 
unexpected as employment and labour market policy in France has long been characterised 
by a complex set of trade-offs and ‘steering’ between more classically interventionist and 
marketising initiatives (Milner, 2012b). Incrementalism and compromise are features of the 
 16 
 
specific mode of governance chosen to enact reform, that is, state-driven bargaining in 
order to achieve managed flexibility. 
However, by mid-term the failure to stem rising unemployment had already proved fatally 
damaging to the executive. By mid-2015, two further reform packages building on the 2013 
law provided the basis for a negotiated trade-off between business flexibility and social 
protection, with the aim of stimulating business confidence, also targeted by the 
responsibility pact. However the method – ‘fourre-tout’ or catchall packages combining 
several discrete measures with variable impacts – had by now become widely criticised as 
‘too little, too late’. By emphasising the need for a clean start, the socialist president and 
government opened themselves to two major risks: first, that their claims to reformism 
lacked credibility; second, that their left-wing electoral base would desert them. The March 
2015 departmental elections saw the socialists, who had previously controlled the majority 
of departmental councils, trounced by the mainstream right and increasingly threatened by 
the rise of the far right, although the latter had been largely contained by the two-round 
voting system. Moreover, the social dialogue which had formed a central plank of the 
socialist governance method in 2012 started to break down in 2014 when three of the main 
confederations walked out, and the 2015 social summit was boycotted by the CGT and 
Solidaires, who argued that the government had instrumentalised dialogue and bowed to 
employer demands (Parsons 2017). The scene was set for conflict in the final act. 
All-out reform? The El Khomri labour law 
The final Act is dominated by the labour law reform known by the name of the minister who 
was appointed to introduce it and steer it through, Myriam El Khomri. Before the reform 
process started, moves had been signalled by a game of words between the prime minister 
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and the finance minister, the latter suggesting in interviews that the 35 hour law was 
uncompetitive and required reform, the former agreeing but stating that the law would not 
be repealed; the latter indicating in interviews that the idea of locally bargained 
competitiveness pacts could be extended to all companies, the former neither denying nor 
confirming but welcoming the debate. 
The process by which the reform was managed appears to have taken inspiration from the 
method by which the Hartz reforms were introduced in Germany by the SPD-Green coalition 
government as a way of tackling rising unemployment. In order to break through 
parliamentary inertia, the German government established a high-level commission chaired 
by the former VW executive Peter Hartz. The reforms thus enacted between 2003 and 2005 
reorganised public employment services and boosted training content of activation policies, 
but also tightened conditionality of benefits and deregulated labour markets, creating a 
secondary labour market of low-paid marginal part-time jobs. Although the reforms 
succeeded in boosting employment (Jacobi and Kluve 2006), they were highly controversial, 
causing major protests (see Lahusen and Baumgarten 2010), and later came under fire for 
trapping many workers in marginal jobs and generating in-work poverty, which led to calls 
for a minimum wage.  
In the French case, rather than setting up a social dialogue process, the government 
commissioned an expert report and then set about drafting a bill on that basis, defining 
social partner input as belonging to the implementation stage. The expert report, chaired by 
senator Jean-Denis Combrexelle, built on earlier reports by consultants and legal experts, 
and in particular from a book published by labour lawyer Antoine Lyon-Caen and veteran 
socialist constitutional lawyer Robert Badinter in the summer of 2015, which sparked a wide 
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public debate. The book’s authors argued that in order to help businesses create jobs labour 
law needed to be modernised and simplified, based on fifty key principles which would form 
the framework for local-level collective bargaining (Badinter and Lyon-Caen 2015). Central 
to both the book and to the Combrexelle report was the idea that company-level bargaining 
could become the main vehicle for regulation of workers’ rights (Le Goff 2015). 
The shift away from legal to collectively agreed regulation has been underway for several 
decades in France, under governments of right and left, including in the 2013 and 2015 
Rebsamen laws as outlined above, and particularly under mainstream right governments in 
2004 and 2008 (Canut and Géa 2016). However, allied to wholesale revision of the labour 
law, it generated controversy for two main reasons: first, because company-level bargaining 
puts trade unions in a relatively weak position, in a context where the vast majority of 
organisations have no trade union presence at all; second, because France’s bargaining 
structure gave sectoral level predominance in order to provide a guaranteed floor of rights 
and especially wage levels, whereas the new proposals reversed this hierarchy by giving the 
local level precedence (Canut 2016).  
The government chose in drafting the El Khomri law to focus on working time as a test case 
for wider revision of labour law, because regulation of working time had already been the 
main focus of bargained flexibility (Favennec-Héry 2016). The bill retained 35 hours per 
week as the legal reference, but allowed greater flexibility in setting overtime rates at 
company level through collective bargaining, and in modulating working hours across a 
period of up 12 weeks. The company level, rather than the sector, has thus now become the 
main locus of bargaining.  
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The El Khomri law did not create a new revised labour code, as Badinter and Lyon-Caen had 
proposed. Rather it continued the form of the earlier reform packages, with a set of 
legislative innovations (such as the ‘right to switch off’ outside working hours)1 and 
incremental modifications to existing law, such as the tighter definition of grounds for 
collective redundancies to make it easier to justify redundancy plans at times of economic 
downturn. It also developed the earlier reforms of 2004 and 2008 on trade union 
representativeness and the principle of majoritarian agreements by opening the possibility 
of ‘referendums’, that is, direct electoral ballots of the workforce, in cases where it proved 
impossible to reach an agreement with unions representing a majority of employees. This 
innovation aroused opposition by trade unions who not only feared unilateral action by 
employers to bypass them, but had drawn lessons from recent cases where employee 
referendums had been used to conclude deals undercutting existing wages and working 
time arrangements. 
By placing new working time regulation within a wider project of revision of the labour 
code, to be completed by an expert commission with input from social partners by April 
2018, the El Khomri law nevertheless sought to create a new ‘grammar’ of labour law with 
decentralised bargaining at its centre (Canut and Géa 2016). In this way it set the stage for 
the later revision of the labour code under the Macron presidency. 
Faced with demonstrations on the street and opposition in parliament, the government 
took the fateful decision to push the bill through using Article 49.3, and the El Khomri law 
was finally adopted in August 2016. However, as noted above, the law continued to divide 
public opinion, and candidates in the 2017 election positioned themselves clearly in relation 
to it, with Emmanuel Macron the main candidate staking a claim to carry forward and 
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extend the reform project, François Fillon articulating a neoliberal abolitionist stance 
regarding existing legal protections, and the remaining candidates mostly advocating the 
repeal of the El Khomri law. The divisions of the late Hollande presidency also loomed large 
in the Macronist project to shorten the national-level social dialogue process as the main 
vehicle for early policy elaboration; instead, the new president stated from the outset that 
he would push through reform by decreee and with minimal consultation, led by the 
executive. 
 
Conclusion 
At time of writing, the Macronist reform project (which is scheduled to begin with a series of 
decrees in autumn 2017, once the enabling bill is passed by parliament) radicalises the 
labour law reform begun with the El Khomri law in 2016, continuing and extending it in 
three key areas: first, by making decentralised bargaining the focal point of social dialogue, 
loosening the safeguards provided by sectoral bargaining and allowing standards to be set 
more systematically at company level where trade unions are weaker; second, by merging 
the existing workplace representation structures; and third, by relaxing legal protections 
particularly around redundancy, and possibly also on employment contracts (Ministère du 
Travail 2017). In all three areas, there is potential for the executive to move beyond the 
‘bounded flexibility’ provided by the Hollande-era reforms and take France into something 
approaching a UK-style neoliberal model of labour market regulation. Following the 
publication of the government’s enabling law which set out the approach for the reform 
decrees, Libération published a leaked document revealing the ministry’s wish-list, which 
included proposals to normalise ‘derogatory’ bargaining (by which decentralised 
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agreements can introduce less favourable terms than those adopted at sectoral level), 
create a single representative structure, make it much easier for firms to lay off workers and 
at the same time reduce the opportunities for employees to seek legal redress, and make 
open-ended contracts more flexible, thus aligning them with fixed-term contracts (Peillon 
and Eychenne 2017). Already the enabling law as adopted in August 2017 announced the 
merger of representative structures and the loosening of redundancy law so that profitable 
firms can close loss-making French operations. Although the labour ministry claims that the 
decrees will be ‘co-produced’ by social partners, so far all announcements have been made 
by the political executive and the timetable for adoption of decrees means that substantive 
input by social partners, particularly trade unions, will necessarily be limited. 
In this article I have argued that the Hollande administration sought to develop a project of 
bounded flexibility in which employer discretion is increased but subjected to collective 
bargaining processes which can allow legal challenge. If enacted, the more radical Macron 
reform works within this approach but extends it to a point where the legal safeguards are 
significantly relaxed and employer discretion substantially increased. In other words, a 
tipping point towards a neoliberal mode of regulation will be passed. Experience of other 
countries such as Germany under the Hartz law suggests that the effect will be to increase 
marginal jobs, wages will be depressed, and social inequality will rise: a new form of labour 
market adjustment to crisis which will bring France into line with its European neighbours. 
In line with the OECD reasoning outlined above, the negative impacts of reform may be 
mitigated by significant investment in activation, retraining and other forms of social 
infrastructure. 
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The socialist project of bounded flexibility failed to gain traction, and promises to bring 
unemployment down were not met, although by the end of the presidency business 
confidence and French export competitiveness were at last starting to recover, thanks at 
least partly to the extensive tax credits system. In this respect the Hollande presidency 
reflects a wider malaise of social democracy in current global capitalism (Rhodes 2013), but 
it also reveals specific institutional and political constraints and tactical mistakes. The two 
major structural institutional constraints identified in the introduction all played a part in 
destabilising the Hollande presidency from an early stage. Having identified unemployment 
as the main yardstick for effectiveness, the executive had to face local elections in March 
2014 with nothing to show for the flagship policies introduced a year earlier, and European 
elections a couple of months later. A factor in the president’s unpopularity (which dipped 
below 50% as early as October 2012, and never recovered) was his inability to project a 
coherent credible plan on employment. In this he may well have been hampered by 
inconsistency within his own government during the early period which highlighted the gap 
between party rhetoric and government action. 
Today, President Macron can confidently accept the label ‘social liberal’ in the context of a 
self-defined centrist programme and outlook (even if historians may balk at this label and 
prefer to see him in the tradition of nineteenth-century European radicalism: see Meuwly 
2016). In 2012, it was still an insult, especially for a Socialist president elected on a social-
democratic manifesto which was deliberately designed to contrast with the record of the 
outgoing Nicolas Sarkozy. 
At the same time, a certain amount of weakness in policy planning and delivery is evident 
with hindsight. As noted above, this applies to the two flagship policies and especially the 
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generation contracts which were not fully worked through and certainly not delivered 
adequately to ensure business buy-in. The available evidence suggests more could have 
been achieved through better relationships with business and better management of 
processes. The same applies more generally to the rushed process of social dialogue. In this 
sense, the five-year presidency worked as a powerful constraint, but weaknesses in policy 
management must also be recognised. More generally, the Hollande presidency failed early 
on to embed the flagship policies in the kind of social investment programme needed to 
achieve significant results: specifically, apprenticeships and investment in active labour 
market policies. This left them vulnerable to a perception that nothing was done and the 
heavy work of investment still needed to be done in 2017. 
 
Notes 
1. The right to ‘switch off’ outside working hours (‘droit à la déconnexion’) has been a trade 
union demand for some time, particularly among unions representing technical and 
managerial staff. Its inclusion in the 2016 labour law bill thus typifies the ‘conglomerate’ 
nature of package initiatives in the employment policy field, as demonstrated in this paper, 
whereby legislators seek to offset the liberalising impact of measures by concessions to 
union demands. At the same time, it nods in the direction of modernising labour law by 
adapting it to changing world of work, in this case by paying attention to the prevalence of 
mobile digital technologies and the way they have blurred the frontier between work and 
home. However, evidence to date suggests that the potentially innovative new right is little 
known and is likely to have only a very weak effect on employers’ labour practices. 
 
 24 
 
References 
Albertini, D. 2013. “Hollande, un social-libéral (presque) assumé.” Libération, 16 May. 
http://www.liberation.fr/futurs/2013/05/16/hollande-un-social-liberal-presque-
assume_903459. 
Badinter, R. and Lyon-Caen, A. 2015. Le travail et la loi. Paris: Fayard. 
Barbier, J.-C. 2008. “The French strategy against unemployment: innovative but 
inconsistent.” In (eds) W. Eichhorst, O. Kaufmann, and R. Konle-Seidi, pp. 69-120. Bringing 
the jobless into work? Experiences with activation schemes in Europe and the US. Berlin: 
Springer. 
Bayardin, V. 2014. “Les contrats aidés de 2005 à 2011.” DARES Analyses no.11. 
Bell, D. S. and Criddle, B. 2014. Exceptional socialists. The case of the French Socialist Party. 
London: Palgrave. 
Bertrand, P. and Chauvot, M. 2016. “La loi Macron, un symbole plus qu’une révolution.” Les 
Échos, 5 August. https://www.lesechos.fr/05/08/2016/LesEchos/22249-055-ECH_la-loi-
macron--un-symbole-plus-qu-une-revolution.htm. 
Birchem, N. 2016. “Où en est-on avec le pacte de responsabilité?” La Croix, 15 February. 
Cole, A. 2012. “The fast presidency? Nicolas Sarkozy and the political institutions of the Fifth 
Republic.” Contemporary French and Francophone Studies 16 (3): 311-321. 
Calignon, G. 2014. “La loi Macron: un symbole fort, mais à portée limitée.” Les Échos, 20 
October. https://www.lesechos.fr/20/10/2014/LesEchos/21796-017-ECH_la-loi-macron--un-
symbole-fort--mais-a-la-portee-limitee.htm. 
 25 
 
Canut, F. 2016. “L’ordonnancement des normes étatiques et des normes conventionnelles – 
à propos du projet de loi Travail”. Droit Social 6 (June): 522-524. 
Canut, F. and Géa, F. 2016. “Le droit du travail, entre ordre et désordre (première partie).” 
Droit Social 12 (December): 1038-1049. 
Cour des Comptes. 2016. Rapport public annuel 2016. Paris: Cour des Comptes. 
Elgie, R. and Grossman, E. (2016) “Executive politics in France: from leader to laggard?” In 
(eds) R. Elgie, E. Grossman and A. G. Mazur, The Oxford Handbook of French Politics, pp.177-
197. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Eurostat. 2017. “Le taux de chômage à 9,5% dans la zone euro.” Communiqué de presse 
no.75, 2 May. 
Favennec-Héry, F. 2016. “La négociation collective dans le droit de la durée du travail”. Droit 
Social 11 (November): 892-897. 
FranceInfo. 2017. “Sondage Odoxa-Dentsu Consulting pour FranceInfo et Le Figaro. 30 June, 
http://www.francetvinfo.fr/economie/emploi/carriere/vie-professionnelle/droit-du-
travail/sondage-plus-de-la-moitie-des-francais-jugent-mauvais-le-projet-de-reforme-du-
code-du-travail_2262243.html. 
Garner, H., Brun-Schammé, A., Naboulet, A. and Le Ru, N. 2016. “Quels leviers pour 
l’emploi? ” Note. Paris: France Stratégie. 
Groux, G. 2005. “L’action publique négociée. Un nouveau mode de régulation?” 
Négociations 3: 57-70. 
Haut Conseil des Finances Publiques (2014) Avis sur les prévisions macroéconomiques du 
programme de stabilité 2014-2017. Paris: Haut Conseil des Finances Publiques. 
 26 
 
Insee. 2016. Tableaux de l’économie française. Édition 2016. Paris: Insee. 
Jacobi, L. and Kluve, K. 2006. Before and after the Hartz reforms: the performance of active 
labour market policy in Germany. Discussion Paper no.1200. Bonn: Forschungsinstitut zur 
Zukunft der Arbeit. 
Lahusen, C. and Baumgarten, B. 2010. Politik und Protest in Zeiten der Hartz-Reformen. 
Frankfurt: Campus Verlag. 
Le Goff, J. 2015. “Faut-il brûler le code du travail?” Esprit 11: 113-117. 
Lux, J. 2015. “France in limbo: on the struggles over accumulation strategies in models of 
capitalism. The case of the pacte de responsabilité.” French Politics 13 (1): 84.102. 
Lux, J. 2016. “Disciplining large member states during the crisis: analyzing the discursive 
strategies of the European Union and German actors on France.” Critical Policy Studies 
online early: 1-17. 
Macron, E. 2017. “Moi président”. Interviewed by . Journal du Dimanche, 9 April. 
http://www.lejdd.fr/Politique/Emmanuel-Macron-Moi-president-859097. 
Meuwly, O. 2016. “Emmanuel Macron est-il social-libéral? Même pas!” Le Temps, 28 
August. https://www.letemps.ch/opinions/2016/08/28/emmanuel-macron-estil-
socialliberal-meme. 
Mias, A, Guillaume, C., Denis, J.-M. and Bouffartigue, P. 2016. ”Vers un dialogue social 
administré? ” La Nouvelle Revue du Travail, 8: 1-12. 
Milner, S. 2012a. “Fixing France’s broken social model? An assessment of employment and 
labour market policy under the Sarkozy presidency.” French Politics 10 (3): 290-305. 
 27 
 
Milner, S. 2012b. “Towards a European labour market? Trade unions and flexicurity in 
France and Britain.” European Journal of Industrial Relations 18 (3): 219-234. 
Milner, S. 2014. “The politics of unemployment policy in an age of austerity: France in 
comparative perspective.” French Politics 12 (3): 197-217. 
Ministère du Travail, de l’Emploi, de la Formation Professionnelle, et du Dialogue Social. 
2015. Bilan de la loi de sécurisation de l’emploi du 14 juin 2013 au 3 avril 2015. Paris: 
Ministère du Travail, de l’Emploi, de la Formation Professionnelle, et du Dialogue Social. 
Ministère du Travail. 2017. Projet de loi d’habilitation à prendre par ordonnances les 
mesures pour le renforcement du dialogue social. Paris: Ministère du Travail. http://travail-
emploi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/projet_de_loi_d_habilitation_pour_le_renforcement_dialogue_soc
ial.pdf. 
Motet, L. and Damgé, M. 2017. “Présidentielles: chômage, éducation, prisons… les 
approximations d’Emmanuel Macron.” Le Monde, 28 April. http://www.lemonde.fr/les-
decodeurs/article/2017/04/28/presidentielle-chomage-fiscalite-prisons-les-approximations-
d-emmanuel-macron-sur-tf1_5118991_4355770.html. 
Observatoire Social de l’Entreprise. 2017. Sondage CESI/IPSOS/Le Figaro sur la réforme du 
code du travail. Paris: CESI. 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2015. “Activation policies 
for more inclusive labour markets.” In OECD, Employment Outlook 2015. Paris: OECD. 
OECD. 2016. Employment outlook, France 2016. Paris: OECD. 
 28 
 
Parsons, N. 2017. “The French presidential elections and the death of social dialogue.” LSE 
Europp blog, 4 April. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/04/04/france-presidential-
elections-death-of-social-dialogue/. 
Peillon, L.. and Eychenne, A. 2017. “Réforme du code du travail: Libération publie le 
document du ministere.” Libération, 7 June. 
http://www.liberation.fr/france/2017/06/07/reforme-du-code-du-travail-liberation-publie-
le-document-du-ministere_1575051. 
Picut, G. 2015. “Le contrat de génération n’a pas rempli ses objectifs.” Le Monde, 8 October. 
http://www.lemonde.fr/emploi/article/2015/10/08/le-contrat-de-generation-n-a-pas-
rempli-ses-objectifs_4785480_1698637.html. 
Pisani-Ferry, J. (2016) Comité de suivi du Crédit Impôts Compétitivité Emploi. Rapport 2016. 
Paris: France Stratégie. 
Rhodes, M. 2013. “Labour markets, welfare states and the dilemmas of European social 
democracy.” In (Eds) M. Keating and D. McCrone, The crisis of social democracy in Europe, 
pp.140-155. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Ruello, A. 2017. “Présidentielle: l’emploi à la trappe.” Les Echos, 18 April. 
https://www.lesechos.fr/elections/presidentielle-2017/0211973553952-la-politique-de-
lemploi-passe-a-la-trappe-2080309.php. 
Terra Nova. 2016. Quels enseignements tirer de la mise en oeuvre de la loi de sécuritisation 
de l’emploi pour orienter la réforme de notre démocratie sociale? Paris: Terra Nova. 
The Economist. 2014. “François Hollande, liberal? The French president promises serious 
supply-side reforms – again.” The Economist 11 (1). 
 29 
 
https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21593421-french-president-promises-serious-
supply-side-reformsagain-fran-ois-hollande-liberal. 
Verner, A. 2017. “Sondage: 61% des Français inquiets devant la réforme du droit du travail.” 
BFMTV, 28 June. http://www.bfmtv.com/politique/sondage-61percent-des-francais-
inquiets-devant-la-reforme-du-droit-du-travail-1196862.html. 
Vlandas, T. 2013. “The politics of in-work benefits. The case of the ‘active income of 
solidarity’.” French Politics 11 (2): 117-142. 
Windebank, J. 2012. “Reconciling work and family life for French mothers in the Sarkozy era: 
working more to earn more?” International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 32 (9/10): 
576-588. 
Table 1: Unemployment in France, 1980-2014 (%of active population) (Insee 2016, 45) 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 2016 
Total 5.1 7.6 8.1 8.9 9.9 
Men 3.6 6.0 7.0 8.7 10.2 
Women 7.3 9.7 9.5 9.1 9.6 
15-24 year-
olds 
11.6 15.1 16.1 22.6 23.4 
 
